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EU Member States increase deployment of intermittent renewable energy sources to deliver 
the 20% renewable target formulated in the European Renewables Directive of 2008. To 
incorporate these intermittent sources, a power market needs to be flexible enough to 
accommodate short-term forecasts and quick turn transactions. This flexibility is particularly 
valuable with respect to wind energy, where wind forecast uncertainty decreases significantly 
in the final 24 hours before actual generation. Therefore, current designs of intraday and 
balancing markets need to be altered to make full use of the flexibility of the transmission 
system and the different generation technologies to effectively respond to increased 
uncertainty. This paper explores the current power market designs in European countries and 
North America and assesses these designs against criteria that evaluate whether they are able 
to adequately handle wind intermittency. 
 
 






+  University of Cologne, Germany 
*  Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) / DIW Berlin - e-mail (karsten.neuhoff@cpiberlin.org). 
•   We thank Julian Barquin, Christian Nabe, and Benjamin F. Hobbs for all their valuable 
comments and input. This paper has been produced in support of the “EU Intelligent Energy 
Europe program” RE-shaping project which also funded part of the research along with Climate 
Policy Initiative.   
1 Introduction 
 
The growing share of wind and other intermittent generation sources in the European power 
supply increases the uncertainty about power production in day-ahead and longer-term 
predictions
1. More accurate forecasts closer to production time reduce this uncertainty. This 
paper provides six criteria that power market designs need to satisfy in order to allow market 
participants and system operators to make full use of this information and thus limit the 
uncertainty and facilitate integration of intermittent renewable energy sources at lower costs 
and larger volumes, while also increasing system security.  
 
Historically, balancing markets have been the only markets to provide reserve and response 
operations. System operators contract this reserve and response capacity in day-ahead and 
longer-term markets with generators to provide flexibility that can be called upon on short 
notice to balance the system when forced power plant outages or load prediction errors occur. 
Balancing was only necessary for events of small probabilities (power station failures) or for 
small volumes (as in the case of load prediction errors); the amount of reserve capacity 
contracted was thus large compared to the small share of actual electricity requested. 
Balancing services were provided nationally, or in the case of Germany, within the region of the 
TSO. Mutual support between regions was restricted to emergency situations, such as 
unexpected power plant failures, and not remunerated (only energy that was provided had to 
be returned). Most power markets imposed penalties for deviations from day-ahead schedules 
to limit demand for balancing power. 
 
In recent years renewable energy and newly installed wind power have prompted additional 
demand for reserve and response operations. This demand arose predominantly due to the 
uncertainty of day-ahead forecasts for renewable feed-ins. This trend will continue as EU 
Member States increase the deployment of wind power and other intermittent renewable 
energy sources to deliver the 20% renewable target formulated in the European Renewables 
Directive of 2008. Therefore, intraday and balancing markets need to be adjusted to allow the 
TSOs to appropriately respond to increased uncertainty.  
  
The forecast error for wind decreases distinctly with a shorter lead-time (DENA, 2005; DENA, 
2010; Focken et al, 2002; Von Roon and Wagner, 2009). Different studies (Muesgens and 
                                                            
1 In this paper we focus on market design issues for reserve and response markets both within a country and 
between European Member States. Glachant and Finon (2010) further point out, that wind energy integration into 
electricity markets creates economic challenges on various additional fronts: support scheme design, strategic 
behaviour in the presence of large-scale wind energy, and new methods for assessing the economic value of wind 
power. 
1 Neuhoff, 2002; Tradewind 2009) point out that system costs for balancing wind uncertainty can 
be significantly reduced if an improved market design allows for optimisation of dispatch across 
the entire system based on wind forecasts with lead-times reduced to 1-4 hours ahead of 
physical dispatch. In markets unable to adapt to changing wind forecasts during the day, large 
volumes a significant amount of balancing reserve capacity and of real-time balancing is 
required. EWIS (2010) and Tradewind (2009) quantify the resulting additional costs for 
electricity generation due to the increased start-up and part-load costs to provide balancing 
power.  
 
The EU has made some progress towards integrating power markets, but today’s intraday and 
balancing market designs are far from a fully efficient and harmonised market. In the third 
Energy Package, a path for further regulatory harmonisation was laid, which aims to foster a 
common energy market. The paper provides criteria that the market design must satisfy in 
order to support the large scale integration of renewables. 
 
•  Facilitate system-wide intraday adjustments to respond to improving wind forecasts, to 
ensure that the least cost generation capacity provides power and ancillary services. 
•  Allow for the joint provision and adjustment of energy and balancing services; to reduce 
the amount of capacity needed to provide balancing services and to operate on part 
load.  
•  Manage the joint provision of power across multiple hours; a broader set of actors can 
contribute energy and balancing services in day-ahead and intraday markets if they can 
coordinate sales across adjacent hours (thus more accurately reflecting technical 
constraints of power stations like ramp-up rates or start-up costs). 
•  Capture benefits from international integration of the power system; the transmission 
network is the most flexible component of the power system, but requires fully 
integrated intraday and balancing markets to replace more costly generation assets and 
enhance system security.  
•  Integrate the demand side into intraday and balancing markets; creating incentives and 
systems that allow the demand side to fully contribute to the available flexibility.  
•  Effectively monitor market power; to ensure that cost-reflective intraday pricing bids 
encourage efficient dispatch choices and 1.) Limits costs for integrating intermittent 
renewables, 2.) Reduces the risk for market participants exposed to intraday 
adjustments, and 3.) Limits the need for utilities to balance within their portfolio and 
thus increases participation.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. The uncertainty of wind forecasts and opportunities to 
reduce it are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the flexibility of the power system to 
2 deal with the uncertainty. In Section 4, the above six criteria for making use of the flexibility of 
the power system and opportunities to reduce wind uncertainties are introduced; a critical 
assessment of which is explored in relation to the effectiveness of current European power 
market designs. Section 5 describes recent EU developments and discusses possible next steps; 
with concluding remarks in Section 6. 
 
2   Uncertainty of wind forecasts, and opportunities to reduce it 
 
The power system has to deal with three main sources of uncertainty: demand uncertainty and 
load prediction errors
2, failure of power plants, and the uncertainty of wind. Figure 1 illustrates 
that the aggregate uncertainty about the balance of power supply and demand increases with 
uncertainties of the individual components. 
 
The following factors need to be considered when evaluating the impact of wind uncertainty on 
the power system: 
 
•  Uncertainty about wind projections decline during the last 24 hours. The demand 
and supply uncertainty that has to be balanced in real time can be reduced 
significantly if additional information and updated wind forecasts within the last 
hours before physical dispatch are used effectively. 
•  The aggregate uncertainty is less than the sum of the individual uncertainties as long 
as errors in wind projections, demand projections, and power failure stations are not 
fully correlated (Dany and Haubrich, 2002). The factor that can contribute the 
biggest real-time imbalance of supply and demand is likely the failure of large power 
stations or transmission lines. If uncertainty in predictions of wind output is smaller 
than uncertainties about other factors, it might only have a small impact on real-
time balancing needs.  
 
There are three ways to reduce uncertainty. 
 
                                                            
2 Demand variations can be further distinguished as: 1.) Load forecast errors, i.e. the deviation of actual demand 
from the forecasted load of electricity, 2.) Stochastic noise of the electricity demand arising from the deviation of 
the load level of each second from the quarter-hourly load average, and 3.) Leaps of electricity supply due to early 
or late delivery of electricity through a scheduled power plant.  






2.1  Improve the accuracy of wind forecasts 
 
The accuracy of the wind power forecast has significantly improved in recent years. In 
Germany, the 24h forecasting error
4 for the aggregate output from German wind turbines was 
significantly reduced from 6.1% in 2007 to 5.6 % in 2008 (Von Roon and Wagner, 2009). Future 
improvements of wind forecasting can be obtained based on improvements of the available 
wind models as well as their coupling. Further improvements of wind models will lead to an 
increase in forecasting accuracy in the coming years. The German DENA II study (DENA, 2010) 
predicts forecast errors onshore might be reduced by as much as 41% by 2020.  
 
Despite this expected improvement in wind forecasts, the DENA grid study (DENA, 2005 and 
Bartels, 2006) shows that the uncertainty about predicting the absolute volume of wind output 
                                                            
3 Similar to DENA (2005). 
4 Root mean squared error (RMSE) of the total installed capacity 
4 day-ahead will increase as wind penetration grows.  Thus the demand for positive and negative 
balancing power, primarily for the time frame >15 minutes will likely increase if the current 
power market designs are maintained (Figure 2)
5.  In short, improved wind forecasts alone will 
not be enough to reduce uncertainty sufficiently - we need to consider other options for 
reducing or managing uncertainty. 
 






2.2  Reduce the lead-time for wind forecasts through intraday markets 
 
The lead-time of wind forecast strictly determines forecast accuracy. When the wind forecast 
changes from a day-ahead forecast to an intraday forecast with a 1-4 hour lead-time, the errors 
decrease drastically. Figure 2 displays the percentage of the total installed capacity for a 1-,2-,4-
,8- hour and day-ahead forecast for Germany in 2008. The average forecast error (RMSE) is 
reduced to 3.8% of the installed capacity compared to 5.9% (7.0%) of the 24h (36h) day-ahead 
forecast. (Smeers, 2008; Von Roon and Wagner, 2009)   
 
 
2.3  Average wind output over larger areas 
 
Large wind areas can reduce uncertainty in the overall wind feed-in. The correlation of wind 
feed-in and uncertainty strongly depends on the distance between wind farms (Figure 3) and 
therefore also on the size of the investigated area. This effect can be observed even for 
                                                            
5 Source: Own graph, with data from Hasche B. (2007) and Von Roon and Wagner (2009) 
6 Estimation for Germany based on Von Roon and Wagner (2009), DENA II (DENA, 2010) 
5 significantly large areas. The integration of the German transmission system operators (TSOs) 
into one market in 2009 provided a good example. The day-ahead (24h) forecast error (RMSE) 
for each of the four TSOs was between 6.6% and 7.8%. Bundling the region reduced the 
forecast error to 5.9% (Figure 2). 
 






This paper focuses on these last two opportunities and thus investigates the institutional 
perspective: reducing lead time through 1) intraday markets and by 2) increasing the size of 
wind areas. 
                                                            
7 Graph: Own. Calculations based on formula and data from Hasche B. (2007). 
6  
3  Flexibility of the power system to deal with the uncertainty 
 
In addition to the opportunities to reduce wind uncertainty described in Section 2, uncertainty 
will remain a decisive part of the system and the power system offers means of flexibility to 
address uncertainty.  The power system can respond to deviations between demand and supply 
by adjusting demand, adjusting supply, or using storage capacity. Three factors determine the 
flexibility of the power system to respond to uncertainties. 
 
 
3.1  System flexibility increases with increasing lead time 
 
The lead time that is available to pursue system adjustments determines the generation and 
demand technologies that can respond. Within the one hour timeframe, the system offers 
three types of response: primary response is available to match unpredicted deviations in time 
frames from 30 seconds to 15 minutes, secondary response is available within 5 minutes and 
tertiary response requires lead times from 15 minute to 1 hour. Only gas turbines, hydro plants, 
and pump storage have the technical capacity to provide a full start within 15 minutes. Coal and 
nuclear power stations must already be operating on part load to be able to contribute short-
term responsiveness. 
 
With lead times of one hour to four hours it is possible to start-up combined cycle gas turbines 
and coal power stations, but longer lead times are necessary to start up nuclear power stations. 
With increasing lead-time more types of generation assets are available to adjust their output. 
 
 
3.2  Interaction between balancing and energy markets influences system flexibility 
 
Many generation assets can only adjust their output close to real-time, if they are already 
operating (nuclear, lignite, coal, and certain gas power plants). Only the plants that are 
operating can provide negative balancing reserve, while these plants have to operate in part-
load to be able to provide positive balancing power
8. Moreover, a power plant is only willing to 
decrease its energy sales to provide reserve capacities for balancing markets if the expected 
price it gets for actually providing those reserves is able to compensate for the foregone margin 
(price minus marginal cost) in the energy market.  
                                                            
8 Power plants such as gas turbines that can provide positive balancing power with a cold start of the turbine often 
face high variable cost of operation.  
7  
Adjustable capacity is therefore highly dependent on the commitment of conventional 
generation units as part of energy sales in day-ahead and longer-term markets and the ability to 
adapt this day-ahead commitment to the changes in the market within the last 24h before 
physical dispatch.  Therefore, when information on the wind-output increases during the day, 
reserve capacity no longer required in the balancing market must be made accessible within the 
intraday electricity market.  At the same time it must be possible to react to changes in the 
electricity market by changing reserve capacities to suppliers that are no longer needed and 
able to offer their capacity to the balancing markets at lower costs.  
 
Market design needs to allow generators to adjust their energy production and provision of 
balancing services in a joint bid, so that they can contribute to an efficient system operation.  
 
 
3.3  Interaction with transmission constraints 
 
In the current European power market designs, transmission capacity is usually allocated for 
long-term and day-ahead energy sales. Some transmission capacity is reserved to ensure 
system stability in the case of unexpected failures of power stations and transmission 
equipment. Only in limited instances, however is it possible to re-schedule power flows 
between countries during the day. This creates a constraint for intraday optimisation of the 
power system – focusing on the generation capacity that is locally available rather than using 
the capacity that is distributed across the entire system. As seen above, the closer to real time 
the scheduled output of generation has to be adjusted, the fewer generators are available that 
can provide flexible capacity. This increases the costs of dealing with uncertainty, compared to 
a coupled reserve and capacity markets, because less suitable generators have to be selected. 
 
In addition, with fewer generators providing flexibility, the likelihood that they can exercise 
market power increases. This results in distorted prices, which increases costs and potentially 
creates inefficiencies in the process of balancing the system.  Options to increase supply of 
flexibility within a region are limited, though we can consider ways to enlarge the region and 
pool of potential players. A coupling of national balancing markets will then again increase 
market efficiency and reduce potentials to exercise market power. 
8  
4  The challenges for the current power market system 
 
The current EU power market designs are analysed here to assess how well they make use of 
the opportunities to limit wind forecast uncertainties that were identified in section 2 and of 
the technical flexibility to deal with these uncertainties identified in section 3. Three specific 
questions translate into six criteria for assessing whether power markets make use of 
opportunities to reduce wind uncertainty and leverage power system flexibility: 
 
Does the market design make full use of information as it becomes more accurate during the 
day? 
1.  Can power system dispatch be adjusted during the day? (Section 4.1) 
2.  Can the requirements for, and providers of, balancing services be adjusted during the 
day? (Section 4.2) 
 
Will all actors that can technically respond be fully included? 
3.  Are the current power market designs suitable for power stations that can only operate 
for several hours at a time, and might thus be excluded in systems where bids are 
submitted hour by hour? (Section 4.3) 
4.  Does the international integration of energy markets facilitate the provision of flexibility 
by actors in neighbouring countries? (Section 4.4) 
5.  To what extent do incentives and systems exist to make full use of the flexibility 
provided by the demand side? (Section 4.5) 
 
How transparent is the market?  
6.  Is it necessary and possible to identify and monitor the potentials and exercise of 
market power? (Section 4.6) 
 
 
4.1  Intraday adjustments to reduce wind forecast uncertainty in balancing markets 
 
Traditionally, power markets focused on long-term contracting between demand and supply 
and provided a platform for day-ahead trading (power exchanges) to match demand and 
supply. Any deviations between demand and supply contracted at the day-ahead stage and 
subsequently realised were adjusted by the system operator with energy from the balancing 
market. Figure 4 illustrates the provision and actual use of balancing energy in a market without 
intraday trading. In this example, the day-ahead forecast in t-24 underestimates the actual wind 
load in t0. The TSO must contract positive and negative capacity reserve for balancing at the 
9 level of wind forecast uncertainty that persists in t-24. In the example in figure 4, the provision 
of reserve and response capacity is unable to adapt to improved forecasts. In t-1, large amounts 
of positive and negative balancing reserve capacities still have to be withheld from the market. 
The deviation of wind output from day-ahead forecasts is then balanced close to real-time 
within the last hour before dispatch (t). 
 
Figure 4: Example I - Wind forecast uncertainty, actual wind feed-in, and balancing services in a 
market without intraday trading. 
 
 
During the day, the improved wind-forecast estimates a higher supply of wind for the specific 
hour t0. With the improved wind forecast, the expected deviation and demand for positive and 
negative balancing capacity also decreases (dotted line). Recognizing this benefit, various 
European countries have established intraday markets to allow for an adjustment of dispatch 
during the day. Still, there is a large variety of power market designs, some more effective than 
others, and whose differences make it difficult for inter-region market coordination.   
 
In the UK, all generators, including wind turbines, have to submit their final schedules to the 
TSO half an hour before real time (gate closure time). Any resulting or subsequently emerging 
deviations between demand and supply are managed by the TSO. Thus, market participants 
can, in principle, use bilateral trading and power exchanges for intraday adjustments. In 
practice, however, all wind turbines are owned by or managed as part of the portfolio of 
incumbent generators and most intraday adjustments and pooling of uncertainties are pursued 
within this limited portfolio rather than across the power system.  
 
10 In Germany, the responsibility for balancing wind output is allocated to the TSO. The joint 
ownership of many TSOs with generation companies providing balancing services created 
incentives to maximise the acquisition of costly balancing services, as costs can be passed to 
consumers through network charges.  
 
Until 2008 wind uncertainty could not be traded in the intraday market. Weber (2010) also 
points out that liquidity in the intraday markets was small. Starting in 2009, however, TSOs 
have been required to also use the intraday market for procurement of services to balance the 
uncertainty of wind forecasts. As a result, the improved forecast accuracy during the day now 
allows the TSO to trade deviation in wind forecast from the day-ahead forecast in the intraday 
market (See Figure 5). Demand for balancing power in t decreases to the deviation between the 
forecast in t-1 and physical supply in t. At the same time the volume of positive and negative 
balancing services that have to be contracted day-ahead reduces to the wind uncertainty 
between t-1 and t.   
 
Figure 5 indicates that these improvements in market design lead to less demand for overall 
reserve capacities. In addition, part of rescheduling of the power plants necessary to cope with 
wind uncertainty is shifted from balancing markets towards the, in general, more flexible 
intraday market. Since 2009 the liquidity in the intraday market significantly increased, due to 
the demand from TSOs.
9 
 
Spanish wind generators have two ways of being remunerated
10 (Royal Decree RD 661/2007 
and de la Fuente, 2010): through a regulated feed-in tariff regime or by being paid a premium 
over the day-ahead price. In the first case they are paid a fixed price of €/MWh times the 
produced energy. In the second case they are paid a premium over the day-ahead price times 
the produced energy as long as the resulting price is between a floor and a cap price. Wind 
generators must remain at least one year in the chosen regime, although arbitrage between the 
regimes has been reported. The wind generators in both regimes must submit a production 
program to the TSO at gate closure of the day-ahead and intraday markets
11. In the case of 
deviations, wind generators are penalized according to specific formulae for both regimes
12. 
                                                            
9 The question of Weber (2010) remains: are intraday markets sufficiently liquid at all times? Therefore can a 
capacity market, such as the balancing market, be fully replaced by energy-only markets (as it is the case of 
intraday markets).  
10 Wind generators operating prior to 2007 can also be remunerated according to a specific regime defined in the 
Royal Decree RD 436/2004 until 2012, in which year they must choose one of the regimes described in the main 
text. 
11 However, the TSO uses its own wind generation forecast software for operational purposes  
12 Specifically, wind generators in the feed-in tariff are not penalized if deviation is less than 20% of the forecast. If 
this figure is exceeded they pay a penalty proportional to the amount of the deviation. Wind generators in the 
11 The TSO operates six consecutive intraday clearing auctions that allow for a full rescheduling of 
power plants and optimisation of the system in line with information about demand and supply 
balance. In addition, as all interactions are focused on six intraday auctions, they exhibit more 
liquidity than observed in other European markets with continuous intraday trading. This 
market solution has allowed the TSO to keep the volume of required balancing services 
constant in the last years, despite the large penetration of wind power in Spain and the limited 
interconnection with neighbouring countries. 
 
Figure 5: Example II - Wind forecast uncertainty, actual wind feed-in, and balancing services in 




Key issues with the current EU system related to intraday trading: market liquidity, regulatory 
framework and transparent wind forecasts. 
 
1.  Liquidity of the markets 
 
The key concern when implementing intraday markets is whether both balancing and intraday 
markets can remain sufficiently liquid. Markets are defined as liquid if the number of bids and 
the amount of trading activity is high enough to create transparent prices and ensure that 
individual actors only have small impacts on the price formation. In 2010 Weber (2010) pointed 
out that intraday markets might not be an improvement per se due to a lack of liquidity. Using 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
premium regime pay a penalty in the case that their deviation is against the system deviation and a zero penalty 
otherwise, according to formulae similar to those used in most European systems.  
12 trading volume in a market as the indicator for liquidity, Weber finds that for 2008 the intraday 
markets in Germany and other selected countries were not sufficiently liquid. Starting in 2009, 
TSOs in Germany have been committed to balancing their procurement for uncertainty of wind 
forecasts through the day-ahead and intraday market, and the liquidity of the intraday markets 
substantially improved when this new market setup was implemented.  
 
2.  Regulatory framework to support TSOs in intraday adjustments 
 
If TSOs are responsible for balancing deviations of intermittent generation from output, as they 
are in Germany, a clear regulatory structure is required. One approach is the use of incentive 
schemes, which expose the TSO to some of the costs for system balancing (or sharing profits 
from savings on balancing costs). Thus the TSO would be motivated to reduce costs that would 
otherwise be fully passed on to consumers.  
 
The U.K. has successfully applied incentive schemes for the TSO to minimise system balancing 
costs (not related to wind which is privately balanced). This has created three sets of 
difficulties. First, to maximise long-term benefit from future negotiations of incentive schemes, 
the TSO has had strong incentives to improve its bargaining position by limiting transparency. 
Second, generators in the UK have complained about non-transparent contracting choices by 
the TSO, reducing trust and certainty. Such sentiments undermine efforts to integrate wind 
power into the dispatch of power systems and to provide transparent information for planning 
and permitting processes of transmission expansion. Third, the U.K. is an island, so incentives 
for NGT (the national TSO) have limited impact on neighbouring TSOs. In the case of continental 
European TSOs, incentives to minimise balancing costs for individual TSOs could lead to 
behaviour that shifts costs and responsibility to neighbouring countries at the expense of 
system efficiency and security.  
 
With difficulties relating to incentive schemes on TSOs, the regulatory solution is a combination 
of (i) minimising exposure to market outcomes, e.g. through clear unbundling of system 
balancing obligations from other business activities, and (ii) providing clear rules for as many 
decisions as possible, while retaining the level of discretion necessary to allow responses to 
unexpected system circumstances. As bilateral contracting is in its very nature based on 
discretionary choices associated with each negotiation, auctions have become the preferred 
market interface in such environments. The Spanish example is a starting point, and many 
power systems in the US (e.g. PJM) have further refined the approach and use rules that are 
guided by the technical constraints of the system. 
 
13 3.  Transparent and accessible wind forecasts 
 
Spain implemented an RES control centre (CECRE) that overlooks the wind feed-in and provides 
aggregated forecasts for the coming 48 hours. All wind farms exceeding 10 MW must be 
connected to this control centre and provide continuous information on status and actual feed-
in. Additionally, CECRE bundles a variety of long term forecasts (up to 10 days) and detailed 
forecasts for the next 48 hours.  This allows for clear market monitoring of installed wind power 
and for a high penetration of special regime generation in the system, which ensures security of 
supply. CECRE has the ability to centrally trigger wind curtailment in times of need. 
 
 
4.2  Joint provision of energy and balancing services 
 
Energy and balancing services are both provided by power stations; decisions about one affect 
the other. For example, a power station that is operating at full capacity cannot provide upward 
balancing services and a power station that is not operating cannot provide downward 
balancing. Furthermore, for most power stations it takes time (minutes to hours) to get started, 
and in these cases only power stations that are providing some power can also offer balancing 
services.  
 
Generation companies therefore have to jointly decide on their provision of energy and reserve 
and response services to the market; they must coordinate these services between spot, 
intraday, and balancing markets. If it is likely that upward balancing energy will be required, it 
might be efficient to operate coal power stations on part load so as to provide that service. If 
the likelihood is lower, it might be (at times of low coal and CO2 prices) be cheaper to operate 
one coal power station at full load, and start up a gas power station if required.   
 
In the past, this was of limited concern. Usually the demand-supply balance did not change very 
much between different weekdays, so actors in the market could learn from the realisation in 
previous days so as to optimise their choice. With increasing penetration of wind power, 
however, the net demand for energy (demand – wind output) and the demand for balancing 
services will vary from day to day; coordination to reach an efficient market equilibrium (many 
local equilibria may exist due to non-convexity of unit commitment choices) is more complex. 
 
14 Key issue with the current EU system: Ability to optimize between balancing and energy 
markets. 
 
The main difficulty for market actors is that in most European power markets, power-plant 
owners must commit their capacities day-ahead either to spot/intraday trading or to balancing 
services. Changing this commitment closer to real-time is not possible. Smeers (2008) points 
out that the current designs of day-ahead, intraday markets and the balancing system in the EU 
are based on three different organizational schemes. Smeers argues that “these multiple 
arrangements violate the finance view that day-ahead, intraday and real-time are just different 
steps of a single trading process and hence require a single trading platform.” 
 
Table 1 shows the current market implementation in Germany. It must be pointed out that 
even though TSOs trade in the intraday market, the power plants contracted to be available for 
the provision of balancing services (for power plant failure and wind uncertainty between t-1 
and t0) cannot be changed. The primary reason is that an intraday market for reserve capacities 
is missing. 
 
An increasing wind feed-in will lead to a reduction of conventional power generation. The 
power plants that offer to reduce electricity supply, e.g. through part-load operation, would be 
able to provide positive balancing power for the same hour at a very low cost but will in 
practice be unable to provide their services due to the given market design. Instead, balancing 
availability is likely to be provided by units with low day-ahead capacity costs (gas turbines) and 
high variable costs, resulting in subsequent increases in balancing costs.  
 
15 Table 1: Market actors and traded products in reserve and response markets
13. 
Type of Market Traded Products Market Actor Day-ahead Intraday Real-time
Wind uncertainty in t-1 until t and 
real-time
TSO
Reserve capacity for power plant 
failure, demand forecast uncertainty 
and intra-hour load volatility
TSO
Wind uncertainty in t-24 until t-1 TSO
TSO trades in 
intraday market
Unforeseen power plant outage 
(after t-4), deviations in the supply 
schedule
Producer Trading
Intraday changes in demand Industry Trading
Time of Trade



















At present it appears to be difficult to implement an intraday market that efficiently processes 
both energy and bids for balancing capacity. The difficulties arise primarily because balancing 
services are acquired by the TSOs, while electricity in spot and intraday is traded on the power 
exchange and bilaterally. Alternative options for joint provision of energy and 
balancing/intraday services are: 
 
•  A fully bilateral market that allows actors to jointly trade energy and balancing 
services. It is difficult, however, to see how market participants could match their 
supply/demand to a complex set of energy/balancing products with specific 
temporal and spatial requirements.  
 
•  Pool type trading arrangements. These centralised market systems facilitate joint 
trading through joint optimization, as is the case in all the U.S. ISO markets such as in 
PJM
14. Intraday market clearing platforms in the PJM system differ from the bilateral 
approach in current European intraday trading schemes. The system operator 
calculates close to real-time an optimal dispatch based on firm schedules submitted 
and flexible bids provided by market participants. These bids can include technical 
parameters like ramp rates and part load constraints to allow the system operator to 
make full use of the available generation assets. This approach ensures high liquidity 
for short-term optimization of the system. Day-ahead (and intraday) markets are 
                                                            
13 Graph is based on the German market design (own graph). 
14 One of the largest electricity market systems in the U.S. comprising all or parts of 13 states and the District of 
Columbia.  
16 pursued using the same market-clearing algorithm for dispatch and transmission 
allocation. This creates inter-temporal consistency and avoids gaming otherwise 
often observed between day-ahead and shorter term markets. Operating reserves 
and energy are co-optimized, and start-up and minimum load costs are considered 
in the optimization and can be recovered through side payments if market revenues 
are insufficient. While long-term contracting remains bilateral, most day-ahead and 
intraday activity is pursued on the centralized platform of the independent system 
operator (ISO) and not bilaterally as is the case in most European markets.  
 




4.3  Joint provision of power across multiple hours 
 
In general a system optimisation (efficient market outcome) occurs if generation companies can 
offer bids that combine offers for their production for individual hours. However, power 
stations require time and incur energy and other costs to be started up. As a result, generation 
companies cannot make decisions on the operation of the power station for individual hours, 
but have to consider interactions across hours instead. This allows for an efficient choice to 
operate a gas-peaking plant at short-demand peaks of one hour, and to start up other plants if 
demand is high for longer times. 
 
17 Key issue with the current EU system: Inter-temporal optimisation of start-up and shut-down 
of power plants. 
 
In systems with large hydro components, like in Scandinavia, start-up costs are of limited 
concern and inter-temporal optimisation is therefore of less relevance.  
 
In other systems, market participants/market places have developed methods to submit a few 
specific block bids, e.g. to provide energy during day-time periods, or to submit ramp-rate, 
start-up, and other constraints as part of their bid, as in U.S. ISO markets
15. The system of 
specific block bidding has worked relatively well as long as it was possible to identify a block of 
hours for which demand will be higher. With increasing penetration of wind power, however, 
this situation will change, and the net demand (demand minus production of wind output) will 
not follow a strict pattern.  
 
The EU needs systems that can reflect inter-temporal dependencies in the production of power 
in order to find efficient market outcomes
16. Market designs across the US (PJM, NY-ISO, Texas, 
California) have evolved so as to allow generators to submit complex bids that reflect start-up 
costs and times, ramping constraints, and energy costs. Based on this information, the market 




4.4  Capturing benefits from international integration of power systems 
 
Larger regions reduce the overall demand for balancing and reduce costs for providing 
balancing power through a broader portfolio of power plants and additional sources for 
balancing power. However, larger regions also include more potential transmission constraints 
that need to be considered. 
 
In some instances this might imply that at times when transmission lines are congested in one 
direction, no upward balancing services can be provided in this direction. At the same time, 
                                                            
15 Ockenfels et al. (2008) suggest that the pool type market models with their central organisation, might allow in 
particular the close co-ordination and synchronisation of generation, transmission, and balancing energy. They 
might be advantageous if competition is strong, they can be regulated effectively and the deficits of a centralised 
system optimisation, which always occur in practice, can be kept small. 
16 Nabe (2006) points out, that for an efficient integration of wind energy, the short term markets must be able to 
cope and process more information especially with regard to inflexibility of conventional power plants. He 
proposes that: conventional power plants should be able to use bid arrays consisting of prices and technical 
information (ramp rates, minimum load, etc.) and Nabe (2006) points out, that such complex bids can only be 
processed by a centralised market mechanism. 
18 however, twice the volume of transmission capacity can be used to provide upward balancing 
services in the opposite direction (against the prevailing energy flow). This might be more 
valuable, because in a region with lots of wind output, only limited amounts of thermal 
generation capacity are operating and the region would therefore be in a position to provide 
balancing services and upward response capacity. In contrast, the importing country is likely to 
have more thermal capacity operating and is therefore potentially better suited to provide 
upward balancing services from this capacity.
17 
 
Key issue with the current EU system: Integration of congestion management with day-ahead 
and intraday energy and ancillary service markets. 
 
By using the potential to trade balancing and intraday electricity against the flow of 
transmission lines or reserve transmission capacities for intraday trading, the integration of 
congestion management and energy and ancillary service markets can enhance the value of the 
transmission network and reduce system operation costs. A complementary paper on 
congestion management discusses the value of an integrated energy and transmission market 
(Neuhoff et al., DIW Discussion Paper 1161, 2011).  
 
Current power market designs focus on an integration of energy and transmission markets at 
the day-ahead stage. As outlined in this paper, the intraday market is of equal importance, and 
the value of the flexibility provided by the transmission system increases closer to real time. 
Therefore a consistent approach is necessary that also facilitates integration of intraday energy 
and transmission markets
18. The U.S. power market designs offer a possible solution. The 
market designs have succeeded in integrating energy, ancillary service, and balancing markets 
at day-ahead and intraday stages by using the same market-clearing algorithm for dispatch and 
transmission allocation for all markets.   
 
 
4.5  Integration of demand side into intraday and balancing markets 
 
Market liquidity can be increased if all market actors (not just conventional power plants) 
capable of providing intraday and balancing services can enter the market. Demand side 
management (DSM), and renewable energies especially, have the technical potential to provide 
their services to the market.  At present, however, only a small share of demand side 
                                                            
17 The effect is even stronger where the importing country is using the imported energy to store water, a process 
that can be easily interrupted with very short response times.  
18 Newberry (2009) points out that the TSOs are subject to national regulation and therefore efficient cross-border 
transactions depend on the national regulation as well as the interplay between the various regulators involved. 
19 management is actually integrated into the markets. DSM technologies (such as reduction of 
electricity demand) face low costs for providing reserve capacities, especially for positive 
balancing power, and work well for circumstances where the probability that those reserve 
capacities will be used is low.
19  
 
Nordpool introduced a harmonization of balance regulation in 2009
20. The new regulation 
lowered the bid size to 10 MWh to explicitly encourage demand side management The 
implementation of automatic activation for bids could further reduce the minimum bid size, 
(Von Roon and Wagner, 2009) thus providing greater incentives for non-conventional 
generation such as DSM to enter the market. Denmark introduced such a system in May 2008, 
and other Nordpool countries are following.  
 
In 2007 in Germany, no DSM-potentials were prequalified and were thus unable to participate 
in the balancing market. An improved market design in 2008 allowed DSM technologies to 
provide balancing services in the minute reserve market. One aspect of the improved market 
design was the introduction of a day-ahead auctioning of minute reserve capacities and a 
reduction of the minimum capacities for prequalification to 15 MW. Energy intensive industries 
made use of their DSM-potentials and provided approximately 20% of the hourly demand for 
reserve capacities in the tertiary balancing market. In the secondary reserve market, 
technologies have to commit their balancing potentials on a monthly basis. DSM technologies, 
however, strongly depend on the downstream production process. A monthly pre-commitment 
cannot be met by most players with potential DSM technologies.  
 
DENA (2010) shows that demand side management has the potential to provide reserve 
capacities for balancing power.
21 Demand side management might further provide load shifting 
from peak to off-peak and low-wind to high-wind periods.  
 
Key issue with the current EU system: Incentives and access for demand side participants. 
 
Tight access rules still prevent large potentials of DSM from engaging in balancing and intraday 
markets. One pertinent criterion to market access is the lead-time and duration of a pre-
commitment to the reserve and balancing markets. Only a day-ahead auction provides 
                                                            
19 Therefore DSM-Potential corresponds to the left and right ends of the probability function in figure 1, while 
conventional power plants are ideal to serve the balancing demand close to the origin of the probability function.  
20 See also Nordel (2008). 
21 Today economic potential for demand side management stems from large industrial processes that serve as 
emergency capacities and are only rarely used. With decreasing costs for Smart-Meter and boxes and through 
bundling a large share of processes future DSM potential will become available in the tertiary sector starting from 
2015 and later on in the household sector.  
20 sufficient incentives for DSM and renewables to participate. In addition, a reasonable market 
design must be implemented that allows small units to engage in the market. 
 
The US experience suggests that demand side investment follows once a market design is 
implemented that provides a long-term, credible framework and justifies the added cost of 
time and capital. 
 
 
4.6  Monitoring of market power 
 
The closer to real time that energy and balancing services are traded, the fewer the participants 
with the necessary technical flexibility and organizational capacity to participate in the market, 
which leads to greater market power for these participants and higher prices. With growing 
penetration of wind power, re-adjustments to the power system will be increasingly necessary 
during these hours close to real time and will amplify these circumstances of limited 
competition.  
 
To avoid exposure to the very short-term market power of generators, system operators 
acquire a significant share of the balancing services in day-ahead and longer-term auctions. 
Multiple contracting rounds reduce, but do not eliminate, the ability of generators to exercise 
market power. However, this approach can preclude optimization across the provision of 
energy and balancing services and intraday adjustment.  
 
In the mid-term, more power will be traded within the last 24 hours before delivery, and it will 
therefore become increasingly important to monitor the bids so as to control the exercise 
market power in these markets. The exercise of market power not only results in rent transfers 
to generators, but also distorts the price signal and thus creates inefficiencies that increase the 
cost of system operation and might provide misleading signals for investment choices. 
 
 
Key issue with the current EU system related to monitoring market power: availability of 
transparent information, ability to evaluate bid price, and capacity to perform market power 
analysis. 
 
1.  Availability of transparent information on bids and state of the system. 
 
The identification of potential market power abuse requires access to information on bidding 
prices as well as a detailed record of the state of the power system. 
21   
2.  Ability to evaluate whether bid prices are appropriate. 
 
In energy-only markets that do not use the marginal bid to determine the market-clearing price 
(e.g. bilateral energy markets), market participants adjust their bid to reflect the scarcity value 
of generation. In this case it is difficult to differentiate between competitive and strategic 
bidding behaviour. Markets (e.g. current power exchanges) where the marginal bid determines 
the clearing price allow generators to submit bids at short-run cost, and are thus more suitable 
for market power monitoring.  
 
However, generators that face inter-temporal constraints cannot offer power for only one hour 
and might therefore adjust their bids to reflect start-up costs and other constraints. Thus, it is 
difficult to assess whether the bid prices are competitive, which constrains the ability for 
effective market power monitoring. The approach in most U.S. markets, in contrast, allows 
generators to submit complex bids containing start-up costs and ramping constraints in 
addition to variable generation costs, such that all parameters can be assessed independently.  
 
3.  Institutional capacity to perform market power analysis  
 
For an effective market power monitoring, an independent institution must have access to all 
relevant market information and must be equipped with the analytic capacity to provide an 
hour-by-hour analysis of the reserve and response markets. As the power system and many of 
the power generators are integrated across European countries, close cooperation or an 
integrated approach across Europe is necessary. 
 
 
4.7  Summary of requirements for a future EU power market design 
 
The EU power systems offer large technical flexibility, which allows for the use of improved 
forecasts to limit the impact of wind uncertainty. Table 2 summarises how the different power 
market designs currently implemented across Europe satisfy the criteria that emerge from this 
requirement. It also illustrates that the power market design that has become standard in the 
U.S. markets, such as PJM, offers the opportunity to satisfy all six criteria.  
 
While long-term contracting remains bilateral, most day-ahead and intraday activity is pursued 
on the centralized platform of the independent system operator (ISO) and not bilaterally, as is 
the case in most European markets. This allows the system operator to calculate at close to 
real-time an optimal dispatch based on firm schedules submitted and flexible bids provided by 
22 market participants, incorporating various technical parameters, such as start-up costs and 
ramp-up times, allowing for inter-temporal optimization for all plants. 
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23 5  Developments in the EU towards an integrated market design  
 
This section explores the developments of the power market designs across the EU and the 
integration of these power markets in recent years. This raises the question of whether a 
continuation of the current process can deliver the improvements necessary to accommodate 
large scale wind and intermittent power station integration in Europe, or whether a more pro-




5.1  Recent developments in the EU power market 
 
In 1999 the EU announced its objective of establishing a well-functioning, efficient, and open 
common market for electricity in Europe. The EU Directive 2003/54 provided a significant step 
towards achieving this objective by developing an outline for access to networks for the cross-
border exchange of electricity. The initial focus was on improving linkage between Member 
States, primarily addressing the wholesale markets. In 2005 Meeus et al (2005) advised that a 
second stage of market integration was necessary where cross-border balancing (and intraday) 
markets should be implemented
22. The sector inquiry in 2006 indicated that balancing markets 
were not yet sufficiently well designed, facing high market concentration, high prices, and 
missing European integration.  
 
In an attempt to mitigate these issues, in 2006, national energy regulators launched a regional 
initiative to create seven regional markets, as a bottom-up attempt to provide a “practical and 
achievable way of delivering step-wise progress towards a competitive single European market 
for electricity.” The regional initiative strived to harmonize the market design within each 
region and to foster the integration of the electricity markets. One measure used to link 
markets was to apply cross border market coupling, which replaced separate trading for energy 
and transmission rights between countries, instead using an internal market mechanism to 
optimize cross border trade.  
 
The Nordic markets were the first to create a coupling of their markets. The Nordpool region 
implemented market coupling in day-ahead spot and balancing markets. In 2006 France, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands coupled their day-ahead spot markets. Germany and Denmark 
joined this day-ahead market-coupling scheme at the end of 2010.   
 
                                                            
22 NWEMPP et al. (2006) also address the importance of market coupling of intra-day and balancing markets.  
24 The coupling of adjacent energy markets has provided significant improvements over day-
ahead market results. Transmission lines are used more efficiently and the traded volumes 
follow the price differences between two regions. Such a market coupling mechanism can be 
applied to intraday markets and balancing markets as well. Smeers (2008) outlines that the so-
called “flow-based market coupling” can provide a reliable platform for such market coupling 
and is, from a computational perspective, applicable for all markets from day-ahead to real-
time, “provided one installs the adequate communication facilities to keep track of energy 
position and grid status”.  
 
Figure 7: Cross border intraday and balancing markets trading arrangements in Europe in the 
beginning of 2009 (EWI). 
 
 
The measures of the regional initiative aim to address spot- as well as balancing- and intraday-
markets. The status reports by ERGEG in 2008 and 2009 revealed that market coupling for 
balancing markets, however, existed only on a few selected interconnections. So far, market 
coupling of balancing markets has only been implemented within the Nordic market region and 
between Germany and the Nordic market region (Denmark). The 2008 report concluded that 
despite the improvements in the day-ahead market, market design or coupling of balancing 
markets still had low priority in certain countries. (See Table 3)  
 
25 First steps have been taken in recent years towards a common electricity market, however 
today’s intraday and balancing market designs are still far from a fully efficient and harmonised 
market (Figure 7). The primary constraint to harmonisation of balancing markets is that these 
markets significantly differ in their market setup (Vandezande et al, 2010). Any approach to 
harmonising the markets must be able to overcome different gate closure times and to 
determine a balancing responsible party. The question remains whether the bottom-up 
approach is sufficient to reach the overall common energy market. 
 
The EU Commission identified the need for a restructuring and harmonisation of the European 
electricity markets and implemented the third energy package that went into legislation in 
2009. In five regulations the European Commission laid out the path for a European electricity 
regulating body and a harmonisation of the regulating authorities in Europe. The third energy 
package implements a European TSO (ENTSO-E) and aims to develop a strong and independent 
European regulatory body (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) that complements 
the national energy regulators and fosters the harmonisation of the common energy market. 
This energy package departs from the bottom-up approach by implementing strong centralized 
structures that allow a top-down roll out of a harmonized market system. The EU regulation 
does not yet provide a clear vision how such a common market for spot, intraday, and 
balancing markets could be achieved and a binding process is still lacking at the EU-level to 
ensure harmonisation of rules for all markets (Eurelectric 2009). 
 
Table 1: Congestion Management and Market Coupling: An Overview of the European 
approaches up to 2010.
23 Not represented in a regional initiative: Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Malta and Switzerland. Continued on next page. 
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23  Primary source: ERGEG Status reports. ERGEG (2009) 
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5.2 Way  forward 
 
Apart from the question of what market designs have to be implemented, one of the key issues 
in 2010 is how to implement an improved power market design. To understand the viability of 
27 potential processes towards such a power market design, it is necessary to assess the interests 
of key stakeholders.  
 
For a variety of reasons individual stakeholders might attempt to block, delay, or derail 
improvements to the power market design: 
 
•  Some existing generators might be concerned about an enhanced level of 
competition that might reduce lucrative margins in the intraday and balancing 
market. 
•  Some dominant incumbent generation companies might oppose a change to the 
market design that removes the benefit of internal balancing within the portfolio 
and thus removes barriers for the entry of third (competing) generators. 
•  If traders focus on short-term arbitrage across countries and intraday markets, then 
improved market design might eliminate all such arbitrage opportunities. Where 
traders do not have the skills to refocus their activities on longer-term and intra-fuel 
trading and hedging requirements for the power market (which are facilitated with 
more robust reference prices), they might oppose the change. 
 
This raises the question of whether the potential opposition by these stakeholders might be 
compensated by support from stakeholders who benefit from an improved power market 
design: 
 
•  All consumers benefit from reduced system costs (operation, network investment), 
but constitute a dispersed group that is difficult to activate as they only incur small 
benefits individually. 
•  All consumers benefit from increased system security due to improved information 
exchange and from transparency that facilitates accountability. System operators 
with good operational procedures might appreciate this clarity, while badly 
managed TSOs are likely to oppose changes that create more transparency. 
•  Manufacturers of renewable technologies will benefit from an improved market 
design that creates flexibility for grid connection of new generation assets and thus 
avoids delays to the deployment of their products.  
•  Technology companies will benefit from a clear and transparent market design that 
offers a clear interface for new technologies for system control and demand side 
management. 
 
A third group of actors, investors in renewable projects, still seems to be in the process of 
evaluating their position.  
28 •  Renewable energy producers are concerned that in the process of an improvement 
to the power market design, they will lose priority grid access. However, an 
improved market design will provide the benefit of transparent dispatch choice that 
will prioritise generation technologies with low variable costs such as renewables. 
•  Renewable energy producers are concerned that market integration implies a shift 
away from a feed-in tariff with fixed off-take prices to facilitate low-cost financing. In 
fact, the improved market designs create a clear and transparent trading platform 
that allows the public counterparty to use feed-in tariffs and sell the output from 
renewable energy sources. Therefore an improved power market design facilitates 
the continued use of feed-in tariffs, combining the benefits of efficient system 
operation and low-cost financing.  
 
There are potential opponents for market improvement within grid owners and generation 
companies. Given their strong role in domestic policy processes, often as dominant incumbents, 
it is likely that they will be able to block or derail bottom-up approaches to market design 
improvement where agreement of all parties is required.  
 
The main winners are European consumers who will benefit from reduced costs, enhanced 
system security, and an enhanced likelihood of the delivery of renewable objectives. This points 
to the value of pursuing this initiative from a top-down perspective: e.g. with some form of 
leadership at the European level. Two options come to mind: 
 
•  A European framework specifying a harmonised design. The challenge will be to be 
sufficiently precise at the level of a European framework to ensure that the various 
regional implementations will be compatible with each other.  
•  A European sponsored/supported initiative for one subset of European countries. 
Nations can join from the beginning, but can also decide to join the initiative at a 
later stage. This approach is similar to the success of the U.S. American standard 





All long-term electricity scenarios show a large increase in installed wind capacities within 
Europe in the coming decades. Despite significant improvements in wind forecasting, the day-
ahead forecasts will induce increasing uncertainty into the European electricity system. It will 
therefore be essential to make use of two factors: the improving wind forecasts within the 
hours between the day-ahead market and real-time dispatch, and the full flexibility that the 
generation, transmission, and demand side of the power system can offer to limit cost 
increases to deal with this (wind) uncertainty and to ensure full system security.  
 
The power market design therefore has to satisfy six criteria: 
 
•  Facilitate system-wide intraday adjustments to respond to improving wind forecasts. 
•  Allow for the joint provision and adjustment of energy and balancing services.  
•  Manage the joint provision of power across multiple hours. 
•  Capture benefits from international integration of the power system. 
•  Integrate the demand side into intraday and balancing markets. 
•  Effectively monitor market power. 
 
When comparing market designs based on these six criteria, it becomes apparent that none of 
the current power market designs applied across European countries fully meets all of them. In 
contrast, the power market design that has been initially used in PJM and by New York ISO and 
that has since been adopted in Texas and California does satisfy all six criteria listed in this 
paper. The assessment in the accompanying paper on congestion management suggests that 
the PJM type power market design (locational marginal pricing) also performs well with regard 
to the effective usage of transmission capacity. 
 
Given the positive attributes of an alternative design, this raises the question of whether the 
current process of gradual EU power market design improvements can facilitate the 
implementation of such a design. The paper argues that more coordination and initiative at the 
EU level will be necessary to facilitate the effective operation of the common European 
markets. While some of the stakeholders might be reluctant to contribute to such a 
development, European consumers will benefit and EU Member States will be supported in 
their achievement of the renewable targets formulated in the EU renewable directive.  
 
30 The third Energy Package provides opportunities to complement the bottom-up approach 
pursued so far on European power market design with top-down requirements. One 
cornerstone of the Energy package is the centralized organizational structure that is currently in 
place. As many market participants have disincentives to fully support a bottom-up transition to 
an integrated power market design, the provisions from the Energy Package might become 
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